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BATONS AND BARE HEADS: THE STRIKE AT AMATO TEXTILE, FEBRUARY 1958
by fhLLLp Botinosi and Rob Lambojit
Liverpool Street, Benoni. On any Friday, passing
by, you can hear the buzz of work inside the Amato
Textile factory. Outside, women gabble, catching
passers-by to buy steaming mealies from the seives
on the braziers. But mostly they wait for the workers
to come out of the factory with their pay packets.
About 3,700 men work in this factory.
But this is Friday, February 14 th. Not a sound
from the factory. The doors are locked . . . pay nego-
tiations between the works committee of Amato repre-
senting the workers, and the managers have broken
down. On the previous Wednesday afternoon the workers
had stopped work. Urged back on Thursday morning
by their union bosses, they found the doors locked,
and policemen standing by to keep them out. They
had been told: "Come back on Friday morning to get
your pay. You're fired."
Now it's 1 o'clock, Friday. Standing outside the
factory one can hear the songs of many people. From
Daveyton, the Benoni location, and Wattville people
were coming singing "Sifuna 'imali" (we want money)
... Also "we want pound a day".
White and black policemen were standing all round
the factory. Altogether maybe 150.
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The cadets from the police training school at Benoni were not
standing by simply to acquire first hand experience of crowd con-
trol. They had been assigned an actively repressive role in a
carefully orchestrated plot aimed at crushing Amato's workers and
the organisation of the Sactu affiliated African Textile Workers
Union in the plant. According to a confidential memorandum drawn
up by the Amato management later in 1958, the company had already
decided "with the approval of the Department of Native Affairs,
the Department of Labour and Mr Kushke, the General Manager of
the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd
to make a firm stand". First intimations of how firm that stand
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would be came when Saracen armoured cars had marshalled a 2,000
strong column of workers along the seventeen kilometres between
Daveyton and the plant that Friday morning, making what was perhaps
their first appearance against domestic opposition. It soon trans-
pired that the police were also ready to unleash the full force
at their command at the first sign of unruliness or unrest. Less
visible, in the background stood the representatives of the local
and central state who were preparing to bring the newly assembled
armory of repressive legislation to bear on the striking Amato
workers, once they had been softened up by batons and boots.
For most of that Friday, worker discipline held firm, and it
was only after two factory sections were called simultaneously
to collect their pay, and were milling around in front of the gates
that the police were given the opportunity to act. A solid wall
of khaki charged the waiting strikers, and the workers scattered
in confusion. Fleeing, they heard behind them "the rattle of bat-
ons on bare heads". A scattering of possessions littered the fac-
tory square in their wake - dumb testimony to the panic of their
flight. "Hats, coats, bundles and bicycles lay where they had
fallen" wrote the Drum's reporter on the scene.
"We all ran right across a fence - we flattened it"
recalls one veteran today. "The police were hitting
us with batons and the workers were throwing stones
at the police. If you lose a shoe, you can't go back
and fetch it. That was the day I lost my wedding
hat. It was a new hat I bought from Jay's outfitt-
ers ."
The calculated ferocity of the attack can be gauged from the
number of casualties sustained. According to union sources 73
people were hurt, a number of them seriously. Organisational
damage was equally severe, as the company and the state concentrat-
ed their energies on crushing organised worker opposition. By
its own account the company "eliminated about 1,000 trouble-jnakers
and re-organised their production and European management". 340
workers were black-listed, and excluded from employment through
influx control regulations. Richard Luthi who had been at the
centre of the strike was endorsed out to Nyqamakwe in the Transkei
and given twenty four hours in which to leave. He later obtained
a permit from the Native Commissioner of his home district enabling
him to return to Benoni where his family had remained. Upon arriv-
al he was given 30 days by the Benoni Registering officer to arrange
for his family to depart since he was listed as an agitator.
A neighbour of one of our informants, Magnedi, was left unemployed
for 20" years as a result of these measures. Still others fled
to escape arrest. One of the key shop stewards was spirited away
by the A. T.W. I. U. and spent the next two months in other union
centres.
As a repressive response this clearly ranks as exceptional even
by standards of its time. Its effect was calamitous. "Tt16, labour
trouble has not recurred" Amato's report smugly concluded. Union
organisation at Amato Textiles, the heart of the African Textile
Workers Industrial union had been comprehensively crushed. Organi-
sation would not again begin to take root until 1979.
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The Amato strike has yet to receive serious scholarly attention,
an oversight which reflects wider areas of neglect in the history
of the workers1struggle in the 1940s and 1950s. Not only has there
been an almost total absence of studies of factory based struggles,
but there still exists no really comprehensive analysis of a black
or non-racial industrial union. Partly because of this, one of
the key questions of worker and popular politics in the 1950s,
remains unresolved and indeed largely unposed - and that is, why
did the struggles of the new industrial proletariat, which came
into existence during and after the Second World War-, assume large-
ly popular or community based forms? And, conversely, why was
factory based organisation so fragmented, so ineffectual and small?
Edward Feit begins to address himself to these questions. Crit-
icising Sactu's pre-occupation with political struggle, he attri-
butes their relative weakness as an organised industrial presence
to their diffusion of energies into these populist channels. At
the same time he makes virtually no effort to examine the activities
of Sactu's industrially based affiliates on the ground, preferring
to concentrate on the co-ordinating bodies' political role. Even
more startling perhaps, he makes no single reference to the strike
at Amato, which pointed unequivocally to the organised strength
of the African Textile Workers Industrial Union on the factory
floor and alludes
 nQply "to the Amato workers' role in the Benoni
£1 a day campaign. Other writers have plugged in some of these
gaps. Luckhardt and Wall in their recent history of Sactu provide
a wealth of detail on individual union activities, but present
it in an unsystematic and episodic fashion, so that strikes at
Amato and elsewhere are not grounded in any firm understanding
of organisational imperatives, organisational constraints and or-
ganisational development. In the end it is left to Betty du
Toit, herself an organiser for the T.W.I.U. , to give some idea of
the depth and durability of the union presence in Amato and of the
power the workers were able to exert within cramped confines of
factory floor. Yet even here, as with the only other systematic
study of a Sactu affiliated union in the period - that by Goode
on the FCWU - organisational gains are described but not adequately
explained and are often subsidiary to wider political concerns.
What is still missing from all of these studies is an understanding
of the trajectories of capital accumulation and proletarianisation,
less so on a national level than on an industry and regionally
specific basis, and of the kinds of consciousness and organisation-
al possibilities that this evoked and made available. In this
study of the Amato strike we reconnoitre that route. We would
like to stress that much research - in particular interviewing
- remains to be done. Here we present an interim report.
"A REAL STRIKE"16
The Amato strike really was an exceptional event. Although
strikes by African workers had reached their highest level since
the mid 1940s between the years 1955 and 1957 they were as a rule
relatively small and insignificant. Thus although 113 officially
recorded strikes took place in 1957, only 6,158 workers were involv-
ed, while in the following year Amato workers accounted for the
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bulk of the 7,128 workers who took part in sixty four strikes.
Numerically alone, the Amato strike was unusual, but its uniqueness
extends well beyond that. What marks it out as a truly significant
event is the depth and durability of organisation from which the
strike sprang. To anticipate our argument somewhat, it was the
factory floor strength and grass roots militancy nurtured in a
decade long struggle at Amato, that evoked the exceptionally re-
pressive response of the state - not simply the outbreak of the
strike or the fact that 3,700 workers were involved.
The significance of sustaining an organised presence in a fac-
tory of 3,700 for over a decade can best be gauged by setting it
against the record of other black worker organisations at the
time. A persistent feature of black worker organisation over the
decades has been organisational weakness allied to apparent numeric-
al strength. At the apogee of African trade union organisation
in 1945 the Council of Non-European Trade Unions could boast a
membership of 158,000. How much organisational muscle this repre-
sented is nonetheless open to question since this formidable total
was then sub-divided into 119 separate affiliated unions. Even
from this summary survey a picture emerges of fragmented and un-
stable organisation, which except under the boom conditions of
a wartime economy was unlikely to maintain a position of strength.
As South Africa's over-heated economy cooled down under the blast
of competition after the war this vulnerability was confirmed.
Union membership fell off sharply, and most affiliates collapsed,
so that by 1949 a full sixty six CNETU unions had foundered. By
1955 when the rumg of the organisation joined SACTU only 12,000
members remained. SACTU reproduced a number of these flaws.
Starting from a membership of 20,000 workers in 1956 it grew to
53,000 strong in 1961 but once again this was spread over 19 affil-
iates to begin with and fifty one affiliated unions at the end.
Particularly striking in this instance is the regional distribution
of SACTU support. While the bulk of CNETU membership was concen-
trated in the Transvaal (80,000 in 1945). SACTUls membership in
the economic hub of the Rand stagnated at very low levels between
1956 and 1961. Thus in the fastest industrialising area of the
South African economy membership stayed static at around the 15,000
mark, representing a proportional decline from fifty per cent to
thirty per cent of SACTU's membership as a whole.
The crushing of the Amato workers contributed significantly
to this trend, but his only serves to underline that for almost
a decade Amato workers represented a substantial proportion of
SACTU organised workers on the Rand, and an even greater proportion
of unionised African labour. Here again the organisation in Amato
displays some exceptional features, and was, as will be suggested
later, a harbinger of the future.
Linda Ensor has argued that the dilemma of African trade unions
in the fifties was that they
"could only be economically effective if subordinate
to the registered trade unions and that if this eco-
nomic subordination (was) rejected, the only alterna-
tive (was) involvement in the political struggle".
She continues "Given the legal non-recognition of
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African trade unions, the intransigence of employers
against co-operating with them, and the intervention
of the State when strikes are employed to demand rec-
ognition, the only way of influencing employers to
win concessions is by means of the influence of reg-
istered trade unions ... By acting as a pressure
on the registered trade union the African union can
v-in real though limited economic gains for its mem-
bers , for example, wage increases, deductions for
benefit schemes, union access to factories, employers
co-operation in dealing with complaints, etc."
SACTU' s experience bears out much of her claim. The major
organised blocks in the Congress were, those of Textile (TWIU
: ATWIU) Food and Canning (FCWU : AFCWU) and the Laundry, Dyers
and Cleaning Workers Union (LDCWU : ALDCWU). Much of the explana-
tion for the success, perhaps even for the survival of the African
parallel branches of these unions, was_ the industrial leverage
afforded by their registered "parent". The AFCWU for example
used the registered branch to extend agreements reached at Concil-
iation Boards to its African Members, and the TWIU and LDCWU did
the sane.
Yet here again Amato workers were in a league of their own.
Practically the entire labour force in Amato was African, and
it was their collective strength rather than any prior agreement
negotiated by a registered union and extended to its unregistered
African counterpart which was responsible for the remarkable or-
ganisational gains Amato workers made. To sum up then, in the
wider setting of South African labour, Amato workers were excep-
tional; on the Rand they were unique.
RUSSIANS, RIOTS AND SPIVS
How is the peculiar character of Amato to be explained? Both
community and factory contexts have to be taken into account.
Let us begin with the community. 'Community1 is one of the most
overworked and underdefined terms in South Africa's political
vocabulary. What is almost always connoted is some notion of
'community of interests', of a more or less cohesive 'people1,
sharing a common place of domicile and common conditions of life
in a wider racially repressive system. Not only has the term
gained enormous currency in recent political debate, but it has
also been read back uncritically into the past. Reasonably cohe-
sive popular communities are assumed to have existed in the town-
ships from the time the urban population began to expand. Failure
to mobilise or more particularly to sustain mobilisation among
this urban throng, is attributed either to a failure of leader-
ship , or to state repression. Either way, 'the community's' own
characteristics are not held responsible; it has been either tramp-
led under or let down.
The same flaw is reproduced in more materialist accounts.
Here, classes defined at the level of relations of production
somehow naturally and inevitably engage in appropriate forms of
class action. Studies of the post World War II African working
class have yet to break free of this structuralist mould. Working
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class action is reflexive, unmediated by culture, ideology or
sometimes organisation. CNETU rises like a phoenix from the ashes
of the I.C.U., a natural outgrowth of the new industrial working
class. Its collapse elicits a deafening academic silence, only
broken by faint invocations of fragile organisation or state -rep-
pression. Attention immediately switches to the formation of
a much reduced but still insurgent SACTU. The historical account
is peppered with inexplicable gaps.
Such silences can often be traced to a common source. Certain
kinds of actions are read off or deduced from given relations
of production. When unearthed in particular historical situa-
tions, they are then inflated out of all proportion and deemed
archetypical of class action of the time. Yet as O'Meara observes
"in any conjuncture the unity of this or that class cannot simply
be read off from relations of production, but needs to be consruct-
ed via the ensemble of concrete organisational and ideological
forms in and through which that class exists". What is implied
here is the possiblity of disunity and division, more especially
in moments when the working class is still in the process of being
formed. At such times it is the bearer of a multiplicity of dis-
courses, of traditions, of organisational practices and forms,
some of which feed into a more cohesive working class culture,
others of which fade away. In South African history it has been
the 'forerunner' of more 'authentic' class action that have gen-
erally attracted most attention. The 'blind alleys', the 'lost
causes' have been ignored, or worse still, have not been noticed,
even where they were the Jftpst common or the most representative
forms of popular response. Our understanding of the trajectory
of popular or working class action has, as a result, been radical-
ly impoverished. Organisational practices and forms are trans-
posed unproblematically from the 1970s and 1980s to the 1940s
and 1950s, or vice versa, as if in both periods we are dealing
with basically the same thing.
Common sense, and a modicum of research tells us we are not.
Benoni in 1938 was appreciably different from Benoni at the end
of the war, and radically different from Benoni twenty years after.
In 1938 Benoni's black population numbered 12,000 - the second
largest on the Reef. By 1945 this had doubled. Numbers contin-
ued to rise at roughly the same rate reaching 34,000 in 1949,
and then jumping by 6.Q00 more at the end of 1950. By 1957 it
had climbed to 77,391. The town's new industrial proletariat
was exceptionally diverse both in terms of origin and experience.
When the Daveyton location was laid out only in 1955, housing
was allocated on an ethnically zoned basis. It broke down roughly
as follows:
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Over
Male
1129
1699
1977
2238
965
551
151
8710
18
Female
1181
1858
2159
2214
1096
546
147
9201
Under 18
Male
1113
1753
2286
2352
953
562
129
9153
Female
1199
1878
2393
2427
1009
562
146
9614
Total
Xhosa     4622
Zulu     7193
Swazi/Ndebele     8815
Northern Sotho     9231
Southern Sotho     4023
Shangane/Tonga     2221
Venda     573
36678
31
Such categories mask as much as they reveal. At best they
are linguistic groupings (e.g. Northern Sotho): at worst they group
together peoples who have no common cultural or political heritage
at all (e.g. the Swazi and the Ndebele). Nevertheless for the
present purposes they serve to indicate, however imperfectly,
the ethnic diversity of Benoni's newly urbanised population.
Experiences of proletarianisation also varied widely. Numerically
preponderant among the most recent arrivals were labour tenants
from white farms. Streaming in from the Transvaal, the Free State
and Natal, they smuggled themselves into the urban centre by first
taking work on the small holdings round Benoni. Once familiarised
with the urban job market they then vanished into the lawless
anonymity of the 'Indian Bazaar', only to reappear, ethnically
wrapped, in one of the new 'ethnic1 units of Daveyton location.
This was the path of Paulos Nkhosi, who was ultimately employed
in Amato. Almost as common a route was to accept a mine con-
tract at one of neighbouring mines, and use this as a staging
post into the town. Daniel Duze first began work underground
at Modder East mine, then graduated to surface work, and then
employed the skills gained in this fashion to secure employment
at Burmco - a rubber factory in Benoni which was then expanding
its work force to make tyres for the war. Duze finally ended
up in the highest paying department in Amato.
In the scramble for accommodation he was equally successful.
From his initial base in Modder East compound, he moved to a shack
in a yard in the old location, and finaiJ.y, by a ruse, secured
a house in the new location at Daveyton Jackson Nomsobo took
an identical path. From his home in Tsolo, Transkei, he took
a contract at New Modder Mines in 1944. Two years later he moved
on to Dunswart Iron and Steel, substituting the Dunswart hostel
for the compound at Modder East. 1948 s a w Jackson employed at
J & C Tools, during which time he took up residence in Benoni's
old location. From there he moved job and place of residence
several times ending up ultimately working in Amato and living
in Daveyton. Duze and Nomsobo were perhaps unusually success-
ful. Both were clearly unusually enterprising and Nomsobo had
a standard 5 education. Even so, their route to the towns was
followed by thousands of others, most notably mine workers from
Basutoland who came to constitute the scourge _Qf the Reef •.•/hen
combined into the ubiquitous gangs of 'Russians1.
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Still other elements of the urban population were recruited
directly from the Reserves- In 1950 the influx control officer
of Benoni was complaining irritably about the large numbers of
unemployed in the locations and attributing this directly to the
action of employers.
"Firms continued to employe natives from the reserves
in preference to local labour. They can pay them
a lower salary and because of the difficulty of again
being employed after discharge ...they work harder
and longer."
(The words "they can pay them a lower salary" were later delet-
ed by resolution of the Native Affairs Committee and substituted
by "they find such foreign natives adaptable"). Finally there
was the resettled core of Benoni's established black urban popula-
tion in whose yards many of the newer arrivals lived. Among them
a Marabi style urban culture had developexjL which greeted the new
arrivals with certain distance and disdain.
Benoni's black population was thus both layered and fragmented.
While common privations, shared conditions of life in Benonips
unhealthy, congested locations gradually distilled a common work-
ing class culture, in the early 1950s, for the majority of its
population, this was still in the process of being formed.
Life in the township was also extremely unstable and insecure.
Although the sex and age ratio show a slight preponderance of
women and children (see table I) which might be read as suggesting
settled family life and permanent urbanisation, many of these
unions seem to have been contracted in the town. As a result
for much of the 1940s and 1950s there was a significant section
of the population which was rootless, unstable and had yet to
settle down. Temporary unions, desertions of wives, "unattached
Basuto women", multiplied causing great concern on Benoni's town
council, who feared the social problems that this would spawn.
Such instability and insecurity was compounded by intense pres-
sure on virtually every kind of urban service and resource. While
population doubled during the war, virtually no new houses were
constructed due to shortages of materials and the diversion of
4u
funds to other channels. Only towards the end of the 1950' s
was this backlog wiped out. With new arrivals streaming in daily,
intense competition was bred over what meagre resources existed.
In a manner reminiscent of urban life all over Africa, new, forms
of combination were created, with the object of ensuring some
measure of collective security, many of which were ethnically
tinged. Among the most conspicuous of these were gangs, notably
the dreaded "Russians" who were distinguished by the Sotho blanket
in which their adherents were clad. As these groups began to
carve up the location into separate fiefdoms so-called "faction
fights" flared up. Beginning in 1947, these had become so violent
and uncontrolled that Benani gained the reputation of being the
crime centre of the Rand. Much to the indignation of the -Benoni
City Times the town was described by the British newspaper the
Piii-ly Mirror as ' a lc-cation thirty miles from Johannesburg' where
violence was endemic. To begin with conflict was located among
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rival factions of 'Basotho' , e.g. the Motsieng and the Molapo.
By August 1949 it had widened to embrace conflicts between
1Xhosa' and 'Basyto', in the course of which many serious injuries
were sustained. Ethnic conflict flared intermittently for the
rest of the next decade. In 1954 Piet Pheko recalls 'Zulus' and
' Basutos' flocking in from all over the reef to fight it out after
a 'Russian1 had been killed in Benoni's hostel and the 'Russians'
had killed a 'Zulu1 in revenge. "The 'Russians' were clever"
recalls Pheko, who stood on the roof of a neighbouring Indian
shop to get a grand-stand view of the fight. A small band of
'Russians' lured the 'Zulus' on to waste land near the Zinchem
factory, where they were surrounded by a mass of hitherto conceal-
ed 'Basutos', and then were hacked down. Somewhat later, in
March 1957, this more generalised 'ethnic' conflict erupted once
again when a gang of Xhosa children attacked a Swazi school, kill-
ing one pupil. Children poured out on the streets and soon parents
became embroiled. Because of a number of Zulu casualties Zulu
parents joined the fray on the side of the Swazi, while it was
rumoured that 'the Sotho' would join the 'Xhosa' camp. Schools
closed and 2,000 workers stayed away from work for several days
until the conflict had simmered down.
Observers described these disturbances as 'faction fights'
or 'tribal wars' as if by so defining them their genesis had been
explained. In fact, these conflicts reflected an urgent quest
to secure the barest necessities of life, like a job, or a roof
over one's head, in a situation in which such resources were in
desperately short supply. Jobs were, all too often, people's
gift. Jackson Nomsobo speaks of payments of up to £25 to secure
a particularly prized job in Amato. Piet Pheko remembers how
African Malleable Factories was taken over by Basotho Iboss boys'
and clerks, so that it became a 'Russian' preserve. Daniel
Duze recalls queueing outside of Amato's gates for several weeks
in 1950 waiting hopelessly for work. After another riot in
1950, in which a white policeman was killed, the Location Advisory
Board, representing the longer settled black population, complain-
ed bitterly that "the unemployed of... almost the whole Reef are
accommodated in the Indian section." For some it was a luxury
to work.
Such patterns were not immutable. In October 1954, for example,
a shortage of labour had grown up on the East Rand, which was
so serious that influx control regulations had to be loosened
to allow workers on mine contracts and from the farms to enter
heavy industry. The regulations were not re-instated until 1957,
and the easing of the employment situation which was thus reflect^
ed no doubt influenced the form and phasing of popular struggles.
What remained more intractable for most of the 1950s were short-
ages of housing. It was the need to control such resources -
whether they be jobs, houses or women - that underlay much of
the so -called faction fighting of the time. Following one par-
ticularly violent incident in 1949, the Township Superintendent
commented:
"It is known but not proved that for some time
these (gangsters) have extorted considerable sums
Batons and Bcuie HeacU 10
of money from the unfortunate and gullible native
people by every conceivable pretext such as the offer
of physical and legal protection, housing material,
representation to Council, employment, etc.
The outbreak of fighting is usually an indication
that a rival racketeer is trying to gain control.
The prevailing conditions set out below make such
lucrative business."
He went on to list the following factors
"1) Lack of proper houseing
2) Conditions in the Asiatic area
3) Surplus of unattached Basutho women in the area
4 Difficulty of control of entry in to the loca-
tion area
5) Lack of effective police force."
While Sotho miners or ex-miners grouped themselves into ethnic
factions for collective security, other layers of the town's black
population escaped their common misery by resorting to other means.
Citing an unnamed Council official, in May 1950, the Benoni City
Times reported:
"There are also the urbanised natives who despoil
the better-class natives and who are largely respon-
sible for domestic servants and native males leaving
domestic services. These natives ... have largely
emigrated to the Reef towns from the farms. Once
here they take any job until they settle down - then,
their imaginations are fed by other natives, they
refuse to work as domestics or farm hands because
the pay isn't big enough
These natives develop into Spivs and are the curse
of the location. Other natives working for low wages,
but quite content, have their minds poisoned by the
spiv and won't work. The result is that many natives
join the ranks of the dissatisfied."
Despite the crude stereotyping and internal inconsistencies
contained in this official's argument, at least two insights emer-
ge; firstly the differentiation and layering of the urban popula-
tion whereby one sector was relatively more advantaged in terms
of houses and jobs; secondly, an introversion of competition
and conflict along internal lines of fracture. What remains miss-
ing from this official characterisation is the extent to which
ethnicity and layering interpenetrated or overlapped. At the
present stage of research such issues remain opaque. What is
apparent nonetheless is that some connections can be made. In
the 1949 riot between 'Xhosas' and 'Basutos' "the Xhosas approach-
ed the emergency camp from the direction Wattsville" squatter
camp being the emergency home of the more recently Basotho A
similar, though not entirely analogous, context framed the fight
of 1954, where the 'Zulus' dominated the hos^ls at Benoni, while
the 'Russians' controlled the Indian section.
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The basic thrust of the argument so far is that the scale and
rapidity of urbanisation, the lack of basic services and resourc-
es , and the multiple lines of fracture in Benoni's urban popula-
tion ensured that popular energies would be absorbed in communal
struggles aimed at minimally meeting basic wants. These same
factors likewise inhibited, sustained large scale political mobil-
isation, although from the May Day march of 1950 through to the
stay-at-home of 1957, Benoni witnessed some of the ANC's most
militant struggles on the Rand. Benoni's proletariat was in
the process of being formed - no coherent popular, let alone work-
ing class consciousness had been forged. If anything, a diffuse
Africanism was the most likely and available rallying cry, not
just against whites, but, in the case of Benoni, against Indians
as well. This was the appeal fo squatter leaders like Mpanza
and Mabuya, and it must be counted one of the ANC' s main achieve-
ments of the period that a multi-racial position was preserved.
Failing larger than life revivalist/Africanist leaders, workers
looked to smaller-scale patrons and factions in an attempt to
improve their lot. Only gradually and spasmodically did polit-
ical and trade union organisation take on those roles.
Nowhere is this more clear than in the squatter movement which
began in 1945. Benoni's squatter movement closely resembles that
led by James Mpanza in Orlando the previous year. Like Mpanza,
its leader Harry Mabuya, was diminutive in stature, flamboyant
in character, Africanist in appeal and well read in law. He also
managed the same happy marriage of self-seeking opportunism and
wider public concern. In 1945 v;hen congestion in the so-called
Asiatic section of the location was reaching crisis point, Mabuya
formed his "African Housing and Rates Board". Sub-tenants in
the area were encouraged to subscribe to the Board, and to refuse
to pay the inflated rentals being demanded by their landlords.
Mabuya meanwhile bought tents from war disposal stores and when
the sub-tenants were predictably evicted, he housed them on vacant
council land just west of present Wattville. 'Tent Town1 grew
rapidly and the council's hand was forced. An officially sanction-
ed Emergency Camp was established and Mabuya gained the credit.
Until his death his slate of candidates regularly topped the vote
in the camp's Advisory Board elections.
Numerous squatter communities sprang up in similar fashion
mostly on small-holdings round Benoni, the most spectacular being
that which in June J.950 occupied land set aside for an industrial
township at Apex. Again the council's hand was_JTorced, arid
the new township at Daveyton was the ultimate result. Ironically,
it was only with the Nationalist government's 'site and service'
scheme and the sub-economic housing programme that a settled urban
community began to take shape and that a more coherent working
class culture began to emerge.
"TWENTY YEARS AHEAD OF ITS TIME"64
If the community context of Benoni's workers inhibited working
class and even popular organisation, so too did the uneven and
incomplete character of Benoni's industrialisation. Kaplan, Bloch
and Webster among others have emphasised that while there was
Batons and Bcuio. Ho.adU 12
a massive proliferation of industrial establishments during the
Second World War, and while the average size of establishment
measured in terms of workers employed registered an appreciable
expansion, the capital intensity of manufacturing actually dropped
during the war. The immediate post-war period witnessed a revers-
al of this trend as excess profits accumulated during the war
were funnelled into machinery and plant. Even so, no thorough-
going transformation of the process of production was accomplished
for another decade. The implications of this pattern of arrested
transformation were that the existing labour process and division
of labour had yet to be fundamentally disturbed. Most factories
remained small; most African workers were still consigned to
relatively unskilled work. The conditions for strong factory-
based organisation and for a strong workers' movement had yet
to be set in place.
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the point.
TABLE 2
Number of africans employed in Industry in the Benoni area 1949
African Malleable Foundries 289
Anglo-American Corporation 85
Amato Textile 1724
Alexander and Company 6
Modder Bee Gold Mine (casual) 11
Modder Bee Gold Mine (casual) 9
Bader and Company 138
Burm Company 202
Benoni Engineering Works 358
Cape Asbestos and Insulation 113
Colonial Timbers 73
Cornthwaite and Jane 52
Delfos Ltd 91
Dunswart Iron and Steel Foundries 961
Eclipse Tube Mill Lines 76
Wright Boag and Head Wrightson 537
H. Incledon & Company 53
Industrial Iron & Steel Foundries 56
Prima Iron & Steel Foundries 136
Parrack and Till 94
Reef Timbers 120
Robert Hudson and Sons 115
Rand Milling Timbers 43
Standard Brass Iron & Steel Foundry 230
Van Ryn Estate Sand Plant 132
Aitken Engineering Works 43
Benoni Welding and Cutting Works 11
Benoni Steel Products 12
Benoni Lumber Mills 25
Benoni Stone Crushers 31
F.M. Brewis 23
J.J. Botha 23
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Coronant Foundaries
Express Fire Supply
Far East Crushers
Hume Pipes
Modeler Bee Plantations
Precision Equipment
Pyramid Sand & Stone Supply
Scoop Industries
Stewart Raeburn
W.S. Thomas & Taylor
Thermal Welding Works
Vulcan Engineering Works
African Tile Company
21
14
31
36
33
9
22
20
32
32
35
22
23
6218
828
600
2675
4783
697
9538
TABLE 3
municipal employees
government service
domestic servants
trade and others
farm labourers
Workers employed by sector - November 195767
Agriculture
Brickworks
Industry
Building
Government Depts
S.A. Rand
Municipality
Prov. Admin.
Commerce
Hotels
Domestics
815
56
11030
1251
149
335
1168
100
3672
177
1684
20437
What emerges very clearly from these figures is that industrial
workers still only represented about half of the urban employed;
that Amato workers accounted for more than a quarter of this figure,
and that Amato is quite exceptional in terms of the size of work
force employed. This very disparity thus provides an early intima-
tion of why working class organisation at the point of production
was so limited in Benoni, and why Amato was such a notable excep-
tion to this pattern. To explore the issue further a more detailed
analysis of the textile industry needs to be made.
The textile industry can in many ways be regarded as the pace-
maker of industrialisation in South Africa. In much the same way
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as the struggle of the Amato workers was a harbinger of the workers'
struggle of the future, so the textile industry as a whole in some
senses prefigured the path of South African secondary industrialisa-
tion. In the immediate aftermath of war the textile industry pro-
vided the blueprint for the import-substitution model of secondary
industrialisation. In 1948 textile imports comprised between one
quarter and one fifth of total imports into the Union. With a
view to reducing South Africa's import bill and to promoting South
African industrialisation the South African government embarked
in 1947 on a programme of actively fostering the expansion of tex-
tile production. The Industrial Development Corporation primed
the pump by putting up several million pounds worth of capital,
and found ready collaborators in a number of foreign industrial-
ists. Rising wage costs among the more advanced industrialised
countries were eating in to the profit margins of many expatriate
textile concerns. Compared with most manufacturing industries cott-
on production was characterised by exceptionally high wage costs
as a proportion of total costs of production. The strategy that
ultimately evolved was by the textile industry world-wide was there-
fore tft#t of decentralising production to low wage areas of the
world. Facilitating the shift was the relatively high degree
of mechanisation which the industry had attained, since this allow-
ed it to move to areas where labour, to quote the Board of Trade
and Industry's report of 1951, was on the whole of an "unskilled
agricultural type". On this basis an alliance was struck between
foreign cap ital and the state. The state guaranteed favourable
conditions of production including contributions towards the cap-
ital costs. Foreign capital contributed capital, but above all
technology and expertise. As a result the first cotton textile
mill in South Africa was established in 1947 (Amato). Two more
were constructed by 1948 and by 1950 yet a further five had been
built. Reflecting broader shifts in the character and composition
of the industry, factories were large, they employed. substantial
complements of labour and the machinery was technologically advanc-
ed.
The new textile plants that dotted the country provided a more
favourable, if not more congenial, environment in which worker
organisation could take root than existed elsewhere or had been
present before. As a result of the mechanised nature of production
the majority of workers fell into semi-skilled operative categor-
ies.
U.S. FIGURES
Cotton spinning
Unskilled
Semi-skilled
Skilled
15,3%
26,3%
8,4%
on weaving
25%
28,5%
46,5%
whole
industry
20,6%
56,2%
23,2%
(73)
For African labour this meant elevation out of the ranks of
the unskilled to a position which by virture of the amount of time
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and money expended on training commanded a far greater measure of
bargaining power. For white workers, conversely, it meant displace-
ment , or devaluation of skills - usually the former, which re-in-
forced the predominance of black workers in these grades.
The implications of such a radical reshaping of the customary
division of labour are brought into sharper focus if one considers
the attributes generally accorded to this category of mill worker.
"Semi-skilled workers" the U.S. Bureau of Labour stat-
istics observed "are engaged in occupations requir-
ing the exercise of manipulative ability of a high
order, but limited to a well defined work routine,
or work in which lapses of performance would cause
extensive damage to product or equipment."
The last phrase hints at the achilles heel of the new generation
of factory - the need to prevent breakdowns in production when
expensive machinery was at work. It also pin-points a new site
of worker power. Because of
:iThe high capitalisation of the new textile industry
'the B.T.I, report noted* (and) an account of the
modern high-prductive machinery that has been install-
ed in a period when prices were twice those in the
immediate pre-war period, it is essential to reduce
overheads by working the machinery for two or three
shifts."75
To maintain profitability, in short, machinery had to be kept
in more or less continuous production. Production stoppages were
costly; dislocations of production were, by implication, a vastly
more significant lever of worker power.
Such characteristics were common to the textile industry as
a whole. To cite the B.T.I, report once more "the products are
... to a large extent competitive ... the basic manufacturing pro-
cesses are to a very large extent similar and the type of labour
required is very much the same." Accordingly, the T.W.I.U and
the A.T.W.I.U. were able tp organise increasingly effectively over
the industry nation-wide. Even so, the Amato factory did present
more than usually favourable conditions. To begin with it drew
its labour from the permanently urbanised population of Benoni's
locations. The reason is uncertain, but most likely explanation
is that it served drastically to reduce labour turn-over and ab-
senteeism which stoaci up to 400% in the low wage rural areas such
as Kingwilliamstown. Such were the imperatives towards uninterrup-
ted production that the personnel officer at Amato thoughtfully
printed his own special pass complete with photograph and finger-
print. In a letter to an outraged Native Commissioner he explained:
"as you know we employ 3000 natives from all over
the Reef and this firm being a government subsidised
operation we must depend on our labour and cover em-
ployees as far as possible as far as absenteeism is
concerned ...
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These boys are residing all over the Reef and thus
travel 'to and fro1 daily, some on night shift ...
(Some) must leave Springs and Johannesburg at 3,00
am. you can imagine the loss in £.s.d. if you have
a few hundred machines stopped owing to the fact that
the boys may be arrested for a special pass."
The special accordingly h entitled• its bearer "to
travel to Pretoria, Heidelberg, Nigel, Randfontein,
Springs and Reef locations daily until midnight."
If low labour turn-over and absenteeism was an important factor
in siting the factory at Benoni, the decision did entail an offsett-
ing cost. Basic wages were set at higher levels than elsewhere,
while-.labour stability also permitted more stable worker organisa-
, . 80tion.
One further weapon was also denied the Amato management, as
well as the industry nation-wide, though its significance was prob-
ably much greater for Amato. According to the Factories Act 1941,
and in conformity with International Conventions, women workers,
who might have worked for lower wages and so weakened the bargain-
ing power of men, were debarred from working night shifts. The
1951 B.T.I, report approvingly quoted international moves to "re-
vise and rencler more flexible the term night" in order to overcome
this problem, but by the late 1950s that had not been accomplish-
ed in the Republic. The TWIU had in fact bargained away this re-
striction in a number of worsted factories in the. Cape, although
on exactly what legal basis no-one was quite sure. In Amato such
a move was much more problematical since workers there toiled for
a full twelve hours six to six shift. This once again hints at
peculiar characteristics of Amato not reproduced elsewhere, which
helped inject such intense militancy into the work force it employ-
ed. It is to these that we now turn.
TYCOON CAPITALISM
The special features of Amato Textiles owed much to the character
of its progenitor, Reuben Amato. The eldest of a Spanish Jewish
family of six, he had been forced to shoulder responsibility for
his siblings, after his father died while he was still only four-
teen. Seven years later he decided to emigrate to Australia to
prepare 'a new life' for his family. After gambling his money away
on the boat, he was dumped penniless in the Congo. Here he started
business as a petty trader before eventually moving into ground
nut plantations. Small scale trading with Lever Brothers soon gave
way to the actual production of oil once he purchased his own oil
press and entered into competition with his erstwhile trading part-
ners. From these small beginnings Reuben clawed his way up the
business ladder, gradually accumulating sufficient capital to en-
able him to expand his operations into South Africa. In 1941 he
founded his first South African Company, National Feeds; in 1943
Amato Textiles was launched.
Two features were stamped on Reuben Amato's character by these
early experiences in the Congo. Firstly, a relentless drive to
accumulate. Secondly, an authoritarian andhighly personalised manag-
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erial style. Even when his enterprises had expanded massively,
he remained involved directly in every aspect of their operation,
in the manner reminiscent of the late nineteenth century business
tycoons. To co-directors he
"lacked human understanding, thus riding rough-shod
over people's feelings - a slave-driver in a way ...
a very very tough taskmaster. He was impatient of
any interference and could not deal with board meet-
ings. The smaller private company was better suited
to his style because he was a loner, an individualist
- a brilliant man but pretty unpredictable. But he
had to go pubj-ic to secure more capital for his expan-
sion plans."
Aggresive and impatient, Amato was in constant danger of allow-
ing his ambitions to outstrip his financial resources. A massive
loan from the Industrial Development Corporation provided the basis
for what soon became the largest textile factory in South Africa.
But still Amato could not rest. Ploughing back every cent of pro-
fits into further expansion, he more than doubled his company's
assets between 1949 and 1956, lifting them from £4 to £10^ mill-
ion. With virtually no reserve cover the company was always finan-
cially exposed. A substantial proportion of available cash resourc-
es were permanently tied up in raw material purchases. The company
employed a "rollover" system of financing which meant that jute
bought in Pakistan had to be paid in full in 60 days, the cash
coming from the sale of orange pockets and grain bags made from
the same jute. In addition the majority of their lines were sold
under contract, requiring extremely tight production schedules.
Failure to complete orders within the contract deadlines meant
the imposition of penalties. Company secretary de Beer reflects
"I was in charge of finance at the time - it was hair-
raising. We were on a tight rope the whole time. There
was an absolute tight-ness of money because of over-
expansion. ... It was a colossal affair with a turn-
over of about a million rand a month.
Given these constraints, continuous pressure was exerted on
workers to raise profitability and to keep production on schedule.
When Amato Textiles was established in 1943, the shift system -
that 'boundless and ruthless extension of the working day' - com-
prised two shifts of 9 hours 20 minutes, the first from 5 a.m.
until 2.20 p.m., and the second from 2.20 until 11.40 p.m. The
machines then shut down until 5.00 the following morning. The work-
ing day was dramatically extended in 1950, with the introduction
of three, twelve hour shifts. Two shifts, working six to six, would
be operative in any given week,
Monday to Saturday. This not only increased the amount
of surplus extracted, but also reduced unit costs
of production. To maximise the gains this extended
working day was combined with an intensification of
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labour and to this end the company had established
a differential piece rate system, founded on low basic
wage rate of £2. 2s. 6d. per week. The differential
rates were ranked, starting with the highest rates,
as follows: Sack sewing; Weaving and circular looms;
Spinning, blowroom, winding; and the Jute section.
Pressure to meet deadlines was likewise extreme, and supervisors
were ruthless in disciplining workers to the 60 day roll-over rythem
of production. It was this set of conditions - an extended working
day, greater intensity of labour and necessarily despotic supervi-
sion - that underlay the volatile and refractory character of the
workforce. Throughout the 1950s the company was wracked by work
stoppages. The most vivid recollection of ex-workers from Amato
are invariably the endless strikes that took place "every two
weeks". Daniel Duze recalls one such episode which occurred in
1952 when management tried to replace African workers with colour-
eds in the sack-sewing department. Workers refused to speak to
anyone except Reuben Amato. Amato duly put in an appearance and
settled the matter in characteristic style.
Mr Amato hit Mr Neville, he clubs him. He want to
know why he did this thing, and he calls us inside
the factory.
To restore production as quickly as possible the worker^' de-
mands for no victimisation and no replacement were fully met.
Duze's account conveys some sense of the tensions that were
generated by the need to meet the company's extraordinarily tight
production deadlines. Amato would blame Steinhardt, the production
manager, for any failure to meet deadlines and Steinhardt in turn,
would pressure the supervisors.
De Beer remembers:
"Amato would come in and scream at him. Steinhardt
would say, 'labour doesn't produce, there's a go slow1.
There was a great deal of tension. Amato moved around
the factory constantly, involving himself directly
in the issues.'
'He moved around the factory, and he alwaya^used
to be in a state of massive tension and anxiety.'
On these conflicts, Magnedi commented:
•I still remember when we once made a strike - it was
on a Monday - the director of the company came, Mr.
Amato, he came here and he was fighting with each
and every manager and foreman because production was
lost, thousands of pounds of production. He was fight-
ing with the foremen because when his car comes
 Qin
from Johannesburg, each and everybody was shouting."
It was these particular conditions at Amato which provided both
the incentive and the space for a strong union presence. All that
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was required to translate this into reality was disciplined and
tactically astute worker organisation. This was supplied from
both inside the factory and without. In 1951 full union recognition
was conceded after a sit-in had been engineered by coloured super-
visor, Don Mateman. Mateman had first encountered the tactic when
working on the coal mines at Witbank, where Shangane labourers
had developed "Tsamahantsi" to a fine art, A lunch hour sit-in
was organized on a lawned area in front of the factory offices,
normally out of bounds for the African workers. It was "a beautiful
park reserved for only white girls" . Workers were told to sit on
the lawn together, to do nothing, and to return to work when the
hooter went. The work force of over 3,000 gathered, and it had
impact.
"Workers enjoyed it. Never had they experienced such
unity before. They used to look at this lush green
place, but it was forbidden them. Now they broke it
and sat there."
When the hooter blast signalled the end of lunch break Mateman,
Cindi and the other shop stewards led the factory back to work.
Disciplined unity had been asserted. The management was impressed.
Mateman was immediately called to Steinhards office and the union
secretary Mike Muller was summoned. Full recognition was granted
- shop steward facilities, as well as stop orders, an unprecedented
move for the fifties. "We know the union is responsible" Mateman
was told - responsible exiough, the company hoped, to prevent the
endless minor stoppages.
Other, more conventional strikes followed, and often served
to consolidate union organisation. Factories are rarely fully organ-
ised, and constant effort is required to sustain a strong union
presence. In Amato, ^fPe departments were weak - the high bonus
sections in particular - and there was always a steady turn-over
of personnel. In these circumstances strikes could sometimes help
to consolidate union organisation. Daniel Duze recalls the trans-
formation in his own attitudes which one such confrontation wrought.
Duze had no sooner secured a job at Amato in 1951 than a strike
broke out. At this point Duze's awareness was at rudimentary level,
but it grew through the event. "I didn't understand what they were
doing inside," he says. He was given friendly advice by a junior
foreman - leave the factory quickly, or else the people will beat
you. "I just took up my things and go outside. I didn't know if
it was a strike or what. I just see the people marching." The event
led to discussion, explanation, and a request that he join the
union. "There are many who were recruited after the strike. Almost
all of us joined the union." With a growing commitment over time
because the union gave "security", Duze soon found himself pushed
to the forefront. He was elected a shop steward and in 1952 led
the stoppage referred to above,
"I was one of the organizers. I just switched off
my machine. We got a symbol when we are doing that
thing. We shout, Hewowee, then all the workers rush
to the door."
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Various means were used to co-ordinate worker action. Mateman
recollects:
"There were metal containers in the factory that were
used to store jute material. Workers used to beat
the containers like drums. It made such a noise. Every-
oneknew there was a stoppage or something happening.
When a woman came into the factory, workers used to
joke by beating the drums. But the union taught a
big lesson - the union is discipline. This helped
unity. Also, textile factories are very noisy. When
the machine stops, everybody wants to know what's
happening."
"Middle East" Cinde, so named by workers because he was the
"trouble spot of Africa", recalled the "whispering campaigns" that
were central to the planning and preparation of strike action.
He said that another form of communication was "blowing in bobb-
ins". This gave off a particular kind of whistle, and workers knew
a strike was planned. At lunchtime they would all assemble on the
green grass outside the administration office, the site of the
historic recognition struggle - now spoken of as "freedom square"
by the workers - in a show of collective strength. Workers also
gathered underneath tall gum trees outside the factory where infor-
mation spread between departments. The company had organized work-
ers into football teams "Amato Roses" being one with the intention,
many believed of dissipating discontent. Shop-stewards hold that
this rather worked to their advantage as it provided ideal cover
for strategy discussions. Workers entering one shift would also
meet with the new shift outside the factory, giving brief run
downs on the situation inside the plant.
Strikes were by no means uniformly successful. In May 1955 a
stike over the dismissal of workers led to 163 being sentenced
under the Riotous Assembles Act. Later, in December of the same
year over 300 workers in the spinning department stopped work
after a supervisor dismissed two workers.
"A white guy fired them and we didn't like it. We
stopped our machines and called another supervisor.
We say, this white guy we don' t need him here. Then
they called management, and management fired him."
Once more, legal action was instituted against the workers. The
offenders appeared in court during 1956, charged by the labour
department for participating in an "illegal" strike. 202 Were found
guilty.
Tension was clearly rising, fed by the workers' need for higher
wages on the one side and by the company's strapped financial posi-
tion on the other. By 1957 the company was in deep financialy cri-
sis. The group had expanded rapidly on the basis of extensive loan
finance from the Industrial Development Corporation and Barclays
bank. Both began to foreclose as they became increasingly unhappy
with Reuben Amato's individualistc managerial style. He ignored
the well established practice of consultations over major invest-
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ment decisions, and his liberal perspective on trade unions and
industrial relations issues did not square with the dominant man-
agerial practice: non recognition and repression. It seems that
Barclays and IDC with their quite considerable financial investment
in the company, decided to put an end to this approach, which in
their view had not succeeded in reducing the level of industrial
conflict in the factory and in restoring loss to pr<~ tion. They
therefore exerted pressure on Amato more effectively to discipline
his workers. MA strong line was what they felt to be required.
In six months of negotiations with the company, the union leader-
ship came to realize that the company was incapable of offering
a new wage deal.
"Amato had financial problems and I happened to be
on the spot. I had to call the workers and say: a
strike is not the way to do things, you must be disci-
plined. Don't demand it now. The union asked the work-
ers ±o give the employers a chance to raise the mon-
ey.
At a crucial meeting, immediately prior to the strike, Ruben
Amato pleaded for time.
"He wasn' t in a position to give. He had borrowed
money from many people and they were squeezing him
to pay. He stood up at the negotiations and said,
"Look, fellows, I have no more money." He stood up
and emptied his pockets and said "I'm finished." And
the workers said, "No, how can you be finished?" He
replied, "Look I am finished, but if you give me a
chance, give me just two weeks of production, while
I 'm trying to negotiate for money". Vie understood
his position."
The union leadership may have understood it, but the workers
in Amato were in no mood to listen, and from here the conflict
began to unfold with all the inevitability of a Greek tragedy.
Basic wage rates at Amato had remained stationary for the whole
decade, while the cost of living had continued to climb. With the
move from Apex squatter camp to Daveyton, where over half of Amato's
workers now lived, rent and transport costs had soared. House rent-
als increased from 15/- to £3 a month, so that many tenants began
to fall into arrears and evictions began. Between 900 and 1000
tenants were being interviewed by Daveyton's Location Superinten-
dent each month of 1957 for being in arrears of rent, and ejectment
orders jumped ,from eighty five in August to 412 in September of
the same year.
"If you are in arrears, they wake you up early in
the morning - about 2 o'clock, 3 o'clock or 4 o'clock,
take you to the administration board and ask lots
of questions. Where you are employed, how much do
you get? Why don't you pay your rent?
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Stop-orders on pay packets were introduced at about the same
time, with the intention of recovering arrears, seventy three
being secured in August and 157 in September 1957. The practice
further fed discontent.
"Workers were angry - some, the labourers, were only
getting £1 19s. 3d. per week and 15 bob was deducted
for rent. They've got £1 4. at home for transport
and food."
Bus fares also jumped from Is. 6d. to 2. 6d. in the course
of the year. Tension was screwing up. The Benoni branch of the
ANC memorialised the Council that the mounting charges "make it
explicitly impossible for people to manage their way out to a
better life". "There was a demand by the people all over for
an increase in wages" Advisory Board member Sinaba advised.
But Amato was in no position to pay. The post 1956 recession
had hit the textile industry particularly hard. Amato's difficult-
ies were deepened by the Suez crisis of 1956/7. With that shipping
was directed away from the South African routes and the firm's
jute shipments were delayed. Production was reduced to one shift,
and the company forced to seek renegotiation of credit. De Beer
negotiated extentions with the shipping company Anglo-Africa,
and endeavoured to persuade Barclays Bank to hold off. In addi-
tion, a good friend of the company in the IDC, Mr Carson Smit,
rushed to England to raise new finance. He was the only person
at the IDC who was favourably disposed towards Amato, and when
he died, suddenly in London, the option of additional help fore-
closed.
Meanwhile the workers, well organized and confident after the
successes of the '57 stay away, were now more impatient than ever
with the protracted and unsatisfactory nature of the negotiations.
"We wanted the union to have the power to get the
company to pay us £1 a day, to help us cope with
the families, because we were really helping the
company with our hands. They (the company) have to
understand us. They (the union) advised us^ you must
not bend the company, you must not fight."
There were debates within the work force over tactics when
a minority argued for an alternative to strike action to win their
demands - factory sabotage.
"Workers used to look at the dry hessian and say,
it will take only one match."
In fact, a large raging fire broke out in the jute mill, two
weeks prior to the strike, destroying machinery andL j-ute caus-
ing "considerable damage" to a section of the building. Increas-
ingly, the majority opinion swung in favour of the strike action.
The shop stewards tried to hold the membership back, but by Friday
they too were swept along. On Fabxiiary 12, the workers finally
downed tools. The strike had begun.
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CONCLUSION
The defeat in the strike was a shattering disaster. Organisa-
tion in the factory was never to recover. Some shop-stewards to
this day are so bruised by the experience that they refuse to
talk on the matter. For many a sense of bitterness will never
be erased. Even this does not convey the full implications of
the defeat. In 1957-8 three major confrontations were seemingly
engineered by employers with the union. Each was lost by the work-
ers and the union began a slow slide towards collapse. Today
it remains a faint shadow of its former self as it accepts invita-
tions to sweet-heart status from the management of Frame.
The T.W.I.U.'s were not the only casualties of this period.
The Food and Canning Workers Unions were simultaneously experienc-
ing a similar attack, as the industry slimmed down and monopolised
under the impact of the late 1950s recession. Amato was a fore-
taste of the gathering assault that was being mounted on popular
and working-class organisations. The foundations for the boom
of the sixties were being gradually set in place. A more disciplin-
ed, a more regimented, a more stable working class was being con-
structed, through repression on the one hand, and the provision
of certain basic amenities on the other. Nevertheless, while such
developments paved the way for the boom of the sixties, the eco-
nomic and social re-alignments that followed likewise heralded
the workers' struggle of the subsequent two decades.
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